Women are still underrepresented in politics and it remains unclear how this might change.
We have hand-collected a unique dataset on 108,850 candidates who competed for local council seats in the 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016 elections in the 426 Hessian municipalities. The dataset includes candidates' gender, party affiliation, initial list rank, final list rank, success in obtaining a council seat, and individual characteristics (age, incumbency, education, employment status, occupation) . Second, we have also collected official data on mayor elections. Mayors are exposed and influential politicians within their municipalities. This combination of candidate-level council election data with mayor election data provides a unique setting to explore the effect of female leadership on subsequent female electoral success for rank-and-file offices.
Based on RDD estimations for close mixed-gender mayor elections, we find that in municipalities where a woman has been recently elected into office, voters are more likely to give preferential votes to female council candidates. This effect concentrates on non-incumbent and thus relatively unknown female candidates and translates to a 10% higher probability that a non-incumbent candidate who enters the council is female. Further analysis indicates that the main mechanism for the electoral gains of female candidates is that exposure to a female mayor reduces gender stereotypes of voters regarding the characteristics of successful politicians (i. e. statistical discrimination).
To validate this interpretation, we explore competing channels. 5 First, a backlash effect may ensue and parties may respond to female mayors by assigning less favorable initial list ranks to female council candidates. Party leaders may have specific preferences about the aggregate influence that women should have within the municipality. If female council candidates are placed less 5 While there is an ongoing discussion in the literature as to whether voter or party bias is primarily responsible for female underrepresentation (Black and Erickson, 2003; Koch, 2000) , our results are in line with previous findings suggesting that voters harbor anti-female bias (Ambrosius and Welch, 1984; Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande, and Topalova, 2009) . Our findings are also corroborated by more general psychological evidence that voters use intuitive heuristics, such as gender or physical appearance, to infer candidate qualities (Chiao, Bowmann, and Gill, 2008; Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, and Hall, 2005) , that leader stereotypes are predominantly masculine (Koening, Eagly, Abigail, and Ristikari, 2011) , and that stereotypes can be overcome by new information that runs counter to the stereotypes (Geis, 1993). favorably, voters may be more likely to vote for women to even out womens' initial disadvantage. 6 We show, however, that the initial ranking of female candidates does not vary with mayor gender.
Second, different types of women may be placed on party lists if there is a female mayor, either because different women come forward as candidates or because parties decide to place different women on the ballot. However, we observe no substantial differences in observable characteristics of female candidates in municipalities with and without female mayors. Third, we also rule out an increase in the number of female candidates placed on ballots or changes in voter turnout as mechanisms. Overall, we conclude that the electoral gains of female candidates under female mayors are due to a genuine reduction in voter bias, arguably because statistical discrimination diminishes if voters are exposed to female leaders. 7 To our knowledge, we are the first to show that women in exposed leadership positions induce voters to be more open to female candidates for rank-and-file political offices. As political careers typically begin with the assumption of lower-level offices, the existence of across-office spillovers from exposed leadership to rank-and-file roles offer decision-makers, on top of measures such as gender quotas, a further tool to increase female political representation. While of course the election of a female mayor candidate into office is a democratic act that falls into the hands of voters, a policy implication that follows from our findings is that decision-makers should focus their efforts on encouraging and promoting women in their candidacy for such key political offices. 6 As will be discussed in Section 2.1, parties could also place women more favorably on the list when there is a female mayor, for example because party bias against female candidates declines or because party leaders anticipate a decline in voter bias. Yet, in this case female candidates should be less likely to witness positive rank changes. 7 Our findings are supported by other scholars. In a recent book chapter, Melissa Marshall studies the broader impact of female mayors in Texas and concludes "the presence of these women in prominent political offices may positively impact the emergence of female candidates (...). At the same time, this may chip away at gender stereotypes that have traditionally made it difficult for voters to support women candidates"(see http://news.rice.edu/2015/03/30/whenit-comes-to-female-mayors-texas-cities-have-strong-showing). This paper contributes to various strands of the literature on women in politics. Most closely related are studies that explore how an initial female electoral victory affects future political participation and success of women. Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras, and Iyer (2016) study whether the election of women as members of an Indian state legislature in first-past-the-post elections spawns an increase in female candidacy in subsequent elections for the same office. 8 They observe an increase in female candidacy, primarily because female incumbent legislators are more likely to run again than male incumbents. Our paper extends this literature by placing the focus on changes in how voters perceive female candidates after voters have been exposed to female leadership. This allows us to assess to what extent voter bias is an impediment to female political representation.
Second, given our open-list setting, we can isolate the effect of exposure to female leadership on voters from effects that work through parties' placement of female candidates and changes in candidate characteristics. Third, while the above literature explores effects of female electoral success on the same office, we explore effects across political offices. 9 A second related strand of literature explores the effects of explicit policy interventions, notably quotas, on female representation as well as party and voter bias. Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012) show that the introduction of quotas has substantially increased the share of female Senators in Spain, ostensibly because quotas act as a counterweight against anti-female biases harbored by 8 Broockman (2014) explores a similar research question, but focuses on geographical spillovers from constituencies where women won to female candidacy in neighboring constituencies. 9 Another related literature studies sources of anti-female bias in electoral politics. Shair-Rosenfeld and Hinojosa (2014) study this issue by focusing on incumbency. The idea is that female incumbents, even as they have proven their political abilities by successfully attaining office, may be less likely to be re-elected by voters than male incumbents if voters have a taste-based preference for male politicians. Using data from Chile, however, they find that there are no differences in the re-nomination and re-election probability for men and women incumbents, indicating that voters are not biased against women if they harbor no uncertainty about her political abilities. Shair-Rosenfield (2012) provides similar evidence from Indonesia. However, their results do not allow for any conclusions as to whether the electoral success of one woman benefits other female candidates, i. e. whether it reduces anti-female bias in general. party leaders. 10 In fact, quotas seem to have positive effects on female representation even if the quotas are repealed after some time. Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande, and Topalova (2009) show that in Indian villages where in previous terms female council leadership was randomly assigned, women are much more likely to run for and win council seats. Similarly, Bhavnani (2009) shows that women are more likely to win municipal council seats in Indian constituencies that were reserved for women after the reservation is removed. In the latter study, this long-term effect materializes because women elected through the quota are able to acquire influence over future party nominations. Our results, in contrast, do not show changes in how parties place women but instead improvements in how voters view them. An explanation for these diverging results may be that exposure to female politicians who attained office through quotas has different effects than exposure to women who attained office competitively. In particular, voters may be more likely to update their views about female politicians if those women won their office competitively. 11
Another differentiating feature of our study is the relatively benign context towards women in Germany. Most research on exposure to female leadership in politics is focused on countries that are perceived as relatively male-dominated such as India or Italy. 12 Exposure to female leadership may have different effects in more benign environments. In Germany, even as women continue to be underrepresented, female political participation is generally encouraged. In fact an explicit consensus has emerged across all major parties that it is important to increase the share of women in politics -a consensus, however, that may not be shared by all voters. Some voters, in particular men, may be unhappy about the continued efforts that parties ostensibly put in to increase female representation. It has been argued that in such environments, exposure to a female mayor may 10 See also Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015) . 11 Nevertheless, there is evidence that quotas, too, can decrease voter bias (Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande, and Topalova, 2009; DePaloa, Scoppa, and Lombardo, 2010) . 12 Especially in India discrimination against women has been historically prevalent, both in politics and more generally in society (see for example http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-20863860). cause a backlash against female council candidates (Schwarz, 2010) . Given this theoretical ambiguity, it is an important finding that spillovers for female representation across offices are positive.
While we obtain this result only for the German context, the political system and voter attitudes in Germany are arguably representative for developed countries in general, and thus our results are pertinent to discussions about gender quality in the electoral politics of these countries as well.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical and institutional background. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy.
Section 5 reports the main estimation results and robustness tests. Section 6 provides evidence on mechanisms. Section 7 presents results on further extensions. Section 8 concludes.
Background

Theory
Female mayors harm female council candidates
The election of a woman into a key political leadership role (mayor) may deteriorate the electoral prospects of female candidates for rank-and-file political offices (councilors) for several reasons.
First, voters may have a preference for a specific share of women in political offices leading to a backlash effect by voters. For example, female politicians might be perceived as a risk due to little previous experience with women in office and therefore voters may prefer to hedge against a female mayor by having an even more male-dominated council. Having a woman in the mayor's office may thus make voters even less likely to elect women into the local council. This increase in anti-female voter bias could be due to the same voters becoming more biased against women or due to a change in the voting population because more biased voters turn out.
Second, male party leaders may feel threatened by successful women and fear that competition for their positions will increase if too many women are successful in politics. Alternatively, male party leaders may feel that too many women in politics carries unforeseeable risks. Such perceptions may cause a party-level backlash effect: fewer women would be put on the party list or be assigned less favorable spots. Moreover, the female mayor may use her influence to harm other women since for instance she would stand out less if there are other successful female politicians (Derks, Van Laar, and Ellemers, 2016) .
Third, male party leaders may respond to the threat of female competition by fielding more qualified and even larger numbers of male candidates who increasingly come forward to limit female political influence. This conjecture is in line with Besley, Folke, Persson, and Rickne (2013) who show that when (more competent) women become available as candidates party leaders may replace mediocre male candidates with better-qualified males.
These effects could reinforce each other. Party leaders may anticipate an anti-female backlash by voters and therefore field fewer women and put them on less prominent spots. In addition, voters could interpret the fact that female candidates are fielded in less favorable spots on party lists as a cue that women are less valuable candidates. Finally, qualified women may be discouraged by the backlash effects by voters and parties and may overall be less willing to run for office.
Female mayors benefit female council candidates
On the other hand, there are several reasons why female mayors may improve the electoral prospects of female council candidates. First, exposure to female mayors may induce more voters to elect female council candidates if statistical discrimination is relevant: given the historical underrepresentation of women in politics, voters' mental image of a successful politician may be male and exposure to a successful female politician may alter this image (Koening, Eagly, Abigail, and Ristikari, 2011). Alternatively, the electoral performance of female council candidates may improve because the composition of the voting population changes when a female mayor is in office. A larger number of pro-female voters may turn out. Hence, a reduction in voter bias may be due to change in the beliefs of voters or a change in the composition of the voting population. 13 Second, in most democracies parties determine whether a woman is placed on the party list at all and, if yes, on what spot. If party leaders are biased against women due to statistical discrimination, exposure to female leadership may dispel such bias. Consequently, party leaders may place women on more promising spots or increase the share of women on the lists. 14 However, women elected into the mayor's office likely gain more direct influence over nominations and may use this influence to increase the share of female candidates or to improve the list placement of women in their own party. Hence, a reduction in party bias could be either due to a reduction in anti-female bias of male party leaders or due to a change in the gender composition of party leadership.
Third, female mayors may serve as a role model and thereby influence the willingness of women to run for the council and more specifically the type of women who come forward as council candidates. This selection effect may allow parties to place more and different types of women on lists, giving voters more options to vote for female candidates. As a consequence, female council candidates would perform better in the election. 15 These three mechanisms may again reinforce each other. Perceived voter bias may lead party leaders to place women on less promising list spots (or not at all) even if party leaders are not biased against women. Alternatively, if biased party leaders place women in uncompetitive spots, voters may perceive this as a cue that women are not viable candidates. Finally, qualified women 13 On the other hand, if voters inherently dislike female politicians -i. e. if taste-based discrimination dominatesexposure to female mayors would have no effect on the electoral prospects of female council candidates. 14 If party leaders engage in taste-based discrimination against women (holding the gender composition of party leadership constant), on the other hand, exposure to female leadership should have no effect. 15 Similarly, female mayors may serve as mentors for female candidates, thereby increasing the appeal of female candidates to voters and party leaders. However, we will not consider this in our further analysis as mentorship cannot be directly observed and as it is possible that mentoring efforts towards female council candidates may have been even larger in the absence of a female mayor. may be less likely to come forward as candidates if they anticipate voter or party bias, reducing the average quality of female candidates and thus reinforcing voter and party biases.
Institutional context 2.2.1 Municipalities and local politics
Hessian municipalities are responsible for the provision of a broad range of local public goods such as municipal daycare services, civil protection, and various social services. While there are federal and state-level mandates in some policy domains, municipalities generally enjoy substantial autonomy in deciding on the type and amount of the public goods they provide. To fund these public goods, municipalities rely mostly on a mix of state-level transfers and own-source revenues.
They have, in particular, the right to set the local business and property taxes. Municipalities are also responsible for various regulations such as closing hours or traffic rules. Overall, the municipal administration has substantive influence over the day-to-day lives of citizens.
According to the municipal code -the magistrate constitution -of Hesse (Hessische Gemeindeordnung), the local council is ultimately in charge of monitoring the local administration as well as making the most important local political decisions. Council members thus wield significant political power. However, even with the council being relatively influential, the mayor remains an important political office in Hesse. The mayor is usually a full-time official and is supported by two further officials who work in an honorary capacity. Together they form the magistrate, the administration of the municipality. The mayor is present at the council meetings and is entitled to voice her opinion even though she does not have a vote.
Mayor elections
Since the mid-1990s mayors are directly elected in Hessian municipalities every six years. There is no uniform statewide date for mayor elections. A mayor election is held when the incumbent steps down because his term ends, because he wants to pursue other activities, because he reaches the pension age or because of unforeseen circumstances such as death or illness (Hessami, 2014) .
Candidates, which are typically supported by a party (but there are also many independent candidates), run against each other in at most two rounds. Each voter has one vote in each of the two rounds. In the first round, all inhabitants in a municipality vote for their preferred candidate.
If none of the candidates receives more than 50% of the votes, there is a run-off election with the two candidates who received the largest vote shares in the first round. Whoever wins the absolute majority in the second round is elected as the mayor.
Open-list council elections
Unlike the mayor elections, the council elections in Hesse are held at a uniform statewide date every six years in March. The number of seats in the council depends on the size of the municipal population and may vary from 11 to 105 (Baskaran and Lopes da Fonseca, 2016) . The local council is elected according to an open-list electoral rule (also sometimes called preference or preferential voting). 16 79 days before a council election the election supervisor publishes an official invitation for parties and voter associations to submit ordered candidate lists and a number of supporting documents. 17 All documents have to be received until 69 days before the election. The official lists which each contain at most as many candidates as there are council seats are announced and published by the election supervisor at the latest 48 days before the election. 16 There is considerable heterogeneity across German states in terms of the electoral formula applied to the election of local council members. In some states, there are closed list elections where voters can only choose one party list (Berlin, NRW, Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein), whereas in other states some form of open-list election is applied.
Specific details such as how many votes each voter has and whether individual candidates can receive several votes differ across states. 17 Voter associations are local groups of voters that are allowed to submit candidate lists for elections but do not have the status of a party. Typically, they are organized as associations (eingetragener Verein). For simplicity, we do not distinguish between voter associations and parties in the following and refer to both as parties.
Voters have as many votes as there are seats in the council and there are various options how voters can cast these votes. The simplest option is to make one cross for an entire party list. All votes would be distributed to the candidates on this party list in the order of their ranking. That is, in a municipality with 25 seats, each candidate on a party list that has 25 candidates would receive one vote. If the list has fewer than 25 candidates, the top-placed candidates would receive additional votes. For example, if a party list in a municipality with 25 council seats has only 20 candidates, the first five candidates would receive two votes while the other 15 candidates would receive one vote. 18 A second option is for voters to select a party list but to cross individual candidates off that list. For the final vote tally, crossing-out a candidate works as if the party did not field these candidates. If there are 25 candidates on the list and a voter crosses out two candidates (e.g. those placed on ranks 9 and 10) the two top-placed candidates would receive two votes and all other candidates (except those placed on ranks 9 and 10) would receive one vote. A third option is for voters to vote for specific candidates (even across party lists). Voters can distribute up to three votes to each candidate (cumulating votes) and candidates can be from different party list (cross voting). 19 According to official sources, voters indeed widely use the higher flexibility awarded to them by the open list system (Mehr Demokratie e. V., 2011).
While votes can only be collected by individual candidates (even if, as described above, voters make a cross for the entire list), seats are distributed across parties in proportion to the total number of votes gained by the candidates of a list. That is, if all candidates on a list together receive 30% of all votes cast in a municipality, the party fielding that list would be entitled to about 30% of the 18 Since each candidate can receive at most three votes, the number of candidates on a party list should always be at least one-third of the number of council seats to be able to fully benefit from a vote cast for that party list. 19 The restriction that only up to three votes can be cumulated on one candidate implies that parties should field list where the number of candidates is at least one third of the number of seats. If a party fields fewer candidates, it will not receive all votes if a voter chooses to vote for the list in its entirety. seats in the council. Which candidates from that party actually receive the seats will depend on the number of votes they received as individuals. 20
Intra-party selection and ranking of council candidates
The initial list rank of a candidate influences the likelihood that she is elected. First, there are mechanical reasons: if there are fewer candidates on a list than council seats, the top-placed candidates are more likely to receive a second or a third vote if a voter chooses to vote for the list as a whole. Similarly, if a voter decides to cross out individual candidates, those at the top will receive more votes if the voter otherwise votes for the list as a whole. Second, there are psychological reasons: voters in open-list systems are more likely to vote for top-placed candidates, either because they interpret the list rank as a cue from party leaders about candidate quality or because they simply want to minimize their cognitive effort (Chen, Simonovits, Krosnick, and Pasek, 2014). 21 It is thus important to understand how the selection and ranking of candidates is carried out.
Typically three to six months before the election in March (i.e. between September and December) each party holds a member's assembly. There are no explicit regulations on how the candidate list is voted upon nor are there any official quotas (for gender or otherwise). The only restriction is that it has to take place democratically and in a secret vote. Any member can nominate a candidate and any candidate is given the opportunity to present herself and her agenda to the member's assembly. Candidates have to be at least 18 years old and must have lived in that 20 Note that, therefore, both the performance of the list as a whole as well as the performance of the individual candidate matters for whether a given candidate receives a seat. Candidates who gained many personal votes may still end up with no seat if their list performed poorly and vice versa. 21 The fact that the initial rank is positively correlated with the final rank because a candidate placed high on the list will tend to mechanically receive more votes even if voters do not really prefer her implies that we cannot interpret the total number of votes of a candidate (or alternatively her final rank) as a proxy for voter preferences. Voter preferences over candidates are captured more accurately by rank changes (i. .e. by how much the initial and final rank deviate) since rank changes require true preferential voting. We will therefore focus in the empirical section on this outcome. municipality at least during the last six months before the election. A minimum of three members being present at the assembly suffices for the vote to be secret and valid. In practice, there is substantial heterogeneity in the voting procedures that lead to the final candidate list. The following three procedures are the most common ones: (i) two or more candidates run against each other and the winner is put on the list; the ones who lost the vote may compete against other candidates to get on the list eventually; (ii) the first procedure is only applied to the first few spots; party leaders provide a proposal for e.g. spots 4-10 or 11-15 on which all members can vote yes or no; (iii) party leaders draft a complete candidate list on which all members can vote yes or no.
Thus, while certain democratic principles are upheld in the process that leads to an official ordered candidate list, party leaders have substantial agenda-setting powers. By making sure that preferred candidates are placed on favorable spots party leaders can substantially increase the probability that these candidates enter the council.
Data
Mayor elections
Data source and coverage
Information on mayor elections in all 426 municipalities is available as of 1993 from the Statistical Office of Hesse. The dataset provides information on the names, gender, and party affiliations of all candidates, the number of valid votes per candidate, and the election date.
Descriptive statistics
We provide summary statistics on mayor elections in Table 1 . Mayor elections are distributed in a fairly even manner across the years given that the timing is exogenously determined by historic developments (see Section 2.2.2). According to the first column, altogether 1721 mayor elections have been held in the 426 municipalities during the period 1993-2015. 22 The second column reports the number of elections in which one of the two candidates with the most votes was a woman (mixed-gender races) which amounts to 268 elections. The third column shows that there were in total 55 mixed-gender races where the outcome was within a margin of victory below 10%.
The share of female and male victories is relatively balanced within this window: 29 of these 55 races are won by the female candidate.
Council elections
Data source and coverage
The Statistical Office of Hesse provides comprehensive administrative data on the 2016 local council elections in the 426 Hessian municipalities: information on the names, gender, initial list placement and final list rank of all candidates. For the pre-2016 elections with an open list system (2001, 2006, 2011) , no such administrative data is available. We thus hand-collected this data from various Internet sources such as municipalities websites as well as e-mail communication with the mayors or their administrative assistants and employees of municipal archives. In a second step, we have -based on the same data collection strategy -hand-collected information on the occupation, education level and year of birth of the candidates in our sample. 23 22 We do not consider mayor elections in 2016 since they were too late to affect council elections in March 2016.
We have been able to obtain this information for 52,630 candidates for age (13,303 of these are women), for 53,008 candidates for employment status (13,348 women), for 47,451 candidates for educational attainment (11,285 women), and for 47,451 candidates for occupation (11, 285 women). 24
Descriptive statistics
Municipalities with larger councils have larger lists. Thus, a list rank of 10 in a municipality like Abtsteinach, which only had 15 seats in 2016, is a significantly worse position than a list rank of 10 in Frankfurt, which had 93 seats in 2016. To make ranks comparable, we normalize in the following the raw list rank by dividing it by the number of seats in the council. Table 2 compares (normalized) initial list placements of men and women. The t-tests indicate that on average, a given woman is placed better than a given man. 25 A fortiori, this would suggest no party bias against women. However, this conclusion would be premature given that list rankings of women may be endogenous to perceived voter bias or the characteristics of male and female candidates. Table 2 also compares average rank changes of women and men relative to their initial rank.
As discussed above, rank changes across municipalities are not comparable. Therefore, we also divide the rank change by the number of council seats. Table 2 shows that women on average lose 24 The information on the education level follows from the information on the name and occupation of the candidates. Those with a doctoral or professor title in front of their name or who state that their occupation is professor are coded as "phd". Those who have an occupation that requires a proper university degree (doctors, engineers, architects, teachers, lawyers, high-level public officials) or who have stated such a degree as their occupation (e.g Dipl.-Ing. or M.A.) are coded as "university". All other candidates are coded as "highschool". The education variables are set to missing for candidates with occupations where the educational attainment is ambiguous. 25 The size of the effect is 1.8 ranks in a council with 100 seats or, alternatively, about 0.6 ranks in a municipality with the median council size of 31 seats. while men on average gain ranks in the elections. 26 This result may be interpreted as suggestive evidence that voters are biased against female candidates. Yet, this conclusion would again be premature as it relies only on observational evidence that may be confounded by the initial placement by parties or omitted variables. Nevertheless, it provides a further motivation to explore whether exposure to female leadership changes voters' perception of female candidates.
Empirical strategy 4.1 Baseline specification
We want to explore whether the election of a woman to the mayor's office increases the likelihood that voters give preferential votes to female council candidates in the local election. As discussed before, the extent to which the final rank of a candidate differs from her initial rank is a first-order proxy for how much voters' prefer a candidate. 27 Thus, the we use the rank change of a candidate as our main dependent variable.
Second, whether a woman or a man is elected as mayor is not random. Municipalities that elect a female mayor may be more friendly toward female politicians in general. Thus, broader cultural differences rather than the specific effect of a female mayor may affect how voters evaluate female candidates in the local elections. To identify a causal effect, we therefore implement a 26 The size of the difference is about 0.7 ranks in a municipality with 100 seats, which translates to a difference of about 0.2 in a municipality with the median council size of 31 seats. 27 Note that Section 2.1 discusses the effect of female mayors of the electoral success of women council candidates in general terms. In our context, the electoral success of a women in ultimately determined by her final list rank.
However, the final list rank is not a useful proxy to assess voter preferences because the final list rank of a candidate is significantly influenced by her initial rank for mechanical and psychological reasons (see footnote 21). Thus, the rank change is the appropriate proxy to identify voter preferences. However, we also explore below the aggregate effect of female mayors on the electoral success of female council candidates (i. e. whether female mayors actually increase the probability that female candidates are elected to the council). regression discontinuity design with close mayor elections. 28 Specifically, we compare the rank change of women in municipalities where a woman barely won against a man with outcomes in municipalities where a man barely won against a woman in mixed-gender mayor elections (i. e. in elections where a man and a woman were among the two candidates with the highest vote shares).
The underlying assumption, as usual in RD designs, is that the two types of municipalities are identical in all respects except mayor gender.
Following Gelman and Imbens (2016) , we rely on local linear and quadratic regressions with optimal bandwidths for the subsample of mixed-gender races for the mayor's office. The empirical model is:
where rank change k,i,t is the normalized rank change (rank change divided by council size) of candidate k in the local election in year t in municipality i. 29 female mayor is a dummy variable 28 We report OLS results in Table A .2 in the online appendix. The estimates suggest a weakly positive effect of female mayors on the rank change of female candidates. However, as mentioned above, these estimates are likely biased, for example because of systematic differences in voter preferences. In particular, OLS estimates could be biased downwards if voters in municipalities with female mayors are more open to female politicians in general. Party leaders in such municipalities may anticipate that voters are more favorable towards women and thus place more women on the ballot or place them in higher ranks. As a consequence, female candidates in female-led municipalities would witness smaller rank advancements. More generally, municipalities with female mayors differ across a range of unobserved characteristics from municipalities with male mayors, and some of those characteristics are presumably important for the performance of female council candidates. 29 One might be concerned that if women are generally placed high on party lists, there is not much scope for them to experience a positive rank change. However, this is balanced by the fact that women who are placed at the bottom of lists cannot be pushed downward much further. Given that women are neither predominantly placed at the bottom or top of party lists this concern is not relevant. that is one if a female candidate has won the previous mayor election and is thus in office during the local election in year t, i.e. female mayor i,t = 1 if vote margin i,t > 0
(2) 0 else.
vote margin is the margin of victory of the top female mayor candidate in the previous mayor election (in cases where there was a run-off election, we use the result of the run-off election). f () and g() are linear or quadratic functions of vote margin whose slope may vary at the RD threshold,
i.e. when the vote margin is 0.
We report five different models with different bandwidths. Model (1) uses the CCT optimal bandwidth according to Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) , Model (2) uses one half of the optimal CCT bandwidth, Model (3) uses the double of the optimal CCT bandwidths, and Model (4) uses the IK bandwidth (Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012) . Model (5) reports a local quadratic regression using the optimal CCT bandwidth. All models use heteroscedasticity-robust and municipality-level clustered standard errors for hypothesis tests. The results are collected in Table A .3 in the online appendix. We report the results both for all mixed-gender elections and those with a margin of victory below 10%. We generally find no significant differences, i.e. municipalities with mixed-gender races where the female mayor candidate won against the male candidate exhibit similar characteristics as municipalities where the male candidate won against the female candidate. The only exception is for population size in close mixed-gender races: municipalities with female mayors are larger than municipalities with male mayors. Yet, the effect is only barely significant and may be explained by the highly skewed distribution of city sizes.
Discontinuity in density
Another test explores whether there is a discontinuity in the density of the running variable at the threshold. If yes, it could be argued that agents are able to precisely manipulate the running variable, calling into question the assumption of local randomization. Figure A .1 in the online appendix presents a McCrary plot to explore this issue. We find no significant discontinuity in the density of margin of victory at the threshold.
A related test checks whether women are more or less likely to win close mayor elections. Table 1 shows that the likelihood of a woman winning a close election is roughly similar to that of a man winning a close election. We also provide a more formal test in Table A .4 in the online appendix. We find that men are generally more likely to win mixed-gender races but this imbalance disappears for close elections with a margin of victory below 10%.
Confoundedness with mayor ideology
A further concern regarding the unbiasedness of the RDD approach relates to confounding effects due to the identity of the mayor. First, male and female mayor may systematically differ in their ideological alignment: in particular, female mayor candidates may be mostly from left-wing parties. Consequently, any effect we may observe when estimating Equation 1 may be a consequence of the ideology rather than the gender of the mayor. For example, voters may be more likely to vote for a female council candidate if they believe that women are more able to cooperate with a leftwing mayor (irrespective of the mayor's gender). However, as can be seen from 
Main results
In this section, we report our main results on the rank changes of female candidates. We first present the graphical and regression RDD results and then a number of robustness tests.
Baseline results
Graphical evidence
We first explore the effect of female leadership on the normalized rank change of female council candidates with a standard RDD plot. In Figure 2 , we plot the rank change of female candidates at different values for the margin of victory. For visual reasons, the plot includes only bin averages for bins of size three rather than the raw data. At a margin of victory of zero, we observe a clear discontinuity, indicating that female council candidates perform better in municipalities where a woman closely won the last mayor election against a man than in municipalities with a close male victory. Consistent with this result, the polynomial smooth -which is based on the raw data -similarly shows a significant jump at the threshold. The jump in the bin average is about 3.3 ranks.
Numerically, the size of the discontinuity can be interpreted as indicating that in a municipality with 31 seats (the median council size), women gain around 1.0 ranks if there is a female mayor (compared to when there is a male mayor).
Regression results
Next, we explore the effect of female mayors on the performance of female candidates in a regression framework in Table 3 . Confirming the graphical evidence, the results from all regressions with different bandwidths and polynomials indicate that female council candidates perform better in municipalities with female mayors. Numerically, the estimates suggest an average effect of about 1.2 ranks in a municipality with a median council size of 31 seats (or, alternatively, about 3.7 for a council with 100 seats).
Overall, the results are consistent with the interpretation that exposure to female leadership diminishes anti-female voter bias. However, we explore the mechanisms driving these results in more detail in Section 6.
Robustness
Placebo test
One way to establish the robustness of the baseline results is to explore whether past outcomes can be explained by contemporaneous values of the treatment variable. If the female mayor dummy has a significant effect on the rank changes of women in past elections, it would call our baseline estimates into question. We report results from this placebo test in Table A .6 in the online appendix.
We relate the gender of a mayor in council election year t to the relative rank change of women in the council election held in year t-1. As expected, we find no significant effect of the gender of the current mayor on rank changes of women in the past council election: the effect is substantially smaller than in the baseline regressions and even changes signs across bandwidths.
Scaling of outcome variable
As a second robustness test, we explore whether the estimated effect for the relative rank advancement of female council candidates is sensitive to the normalization of the outcome variable. Table   A .7 in the online appendix reports results with two alternative scalings. In panel A, we use the raw rank change rather than the normalized value. In panel B, we circumvent issues of normalization and use a dummy that is 1 if a female candidate has a strictly positive rank change. The estimates indicate that the baseline results are robust to different scalings of the outcome variable.
The estimated treatment effects are consistently positive and significant. Numerically, we find that a woman gains about 1.3 to 2.1 ranks more and that the likelihood that she witnesses a positive change is about 10 to 22 percent higher if she runs in a municipality that has a female mayor.
Parametric specification
As a third robustness test, we report the results from a fully parametric specification rather than local regressions in Table A .8 in the online appendix. Specifically, we use the entire sample of mixed-gender mayor elections and control for increasingly flexible polynomials of the margin of victory. The results are in line with the baseline findings and statistically significant in all models.
With a linear polynomial, we find that female candidates gain about 2 ranks in the elections when the council has 100 seats. With the quartic polynomial, we find that female candidates gain 4 ranks (i.e. about 1.2 ranks in a council with the median council size of 31). 30 30 A further concern may be that the baseline effect is driven by female mayor candidates who lost their bid and then become candidates in the next council election. However, when we drop this subset of female council candidates from the sample (43 candidates) and re-estimate the baseline specification, we obtain virtually the same results as in Table 3 .
Mechanisms
The previous results show that female candidates are perceived more favorably by voters if they run in a municipality with a female mayor. Specifically, they advance relative to their initial ranking in female-led municipalities. What remains unclear, however, is why this is the case. So far, the results are consistent with the interpretation that exposure to female leadership diminishes statistical discrimination by voters. In fact, given that voters are ultimately responsible for any rank changes, this is the most plausible mechanism. Yet, there are other possible interpretations.
As indicated in Section 2.1, a change in womens' initial list ranking is a possible confounding factor. Parties may place women lower if there is a female mayor, for example due to a backlash effect. In this case, voters may give them more votes only to even out the perceived increase in party bias (rather than because voter bias has declined). An equally important confounding factor are changes in the number or types of female candidates. In addition, it could be that a change in turnout and thus a shift in the composition of the pool of actual voters (rather than a genuine reduction in voter bias due to gender stereotypes being overcome) explains our baseline result.
Change in party bias
Change in initial list placements
To explore whether female mayors have an effect on how parties place female candidates on the ballot, we study whether the initial ranking of women responds to mayor gender. Specifically, do women receive on average better (or worse) list placements if the mayor is female? Figure 3 presents graphical evidence by means of a standard RDD plot. There is no significant discontinuity at the threshold -female candidates receive neither better nor worse placements in municipalities with female mayors. This conclusion is confirmed by regression results reported in We next explore whether list placements of women differ between candidates who belong to the same and to different parties as the mayor. If female mayors use their direct leverage as party leaders to improve (or worsen) the list placement of female candidate, the results should differ for the two subsamples of candidates. In Panels A and B of Table 4 , we thus report results where we split the sample into female candidates who belong to the mayor's party and female candidates from other parties. The estimated effect of female mayors on initial list ranks of female candidates is in both cases insignificant.
Change in the number of female candidates
A further reason why female mayors may lead to better electoral outcomes for female candidates is a change in the gender composition of party lists. First, in municipalities with female mayors more women may decide to run in the council elections because they are encouraged by the success of a female politician. Second, a reduction in anti-female party bias may manifest itself not in a change in list positions of women but rather in an increased willingness to put women on the list. An increased number of women on party lists may then give voters more options to vote for women, thereby improving the average performance of female candidates.
One way to explore this channel is to study whether a given candidate on the ballot is more likely to be female in municipalities with female mayors than in municipalities with male mayors.
We hence report in Table 5 regressions where we relate a dummy variable for the gender of a candidate on the ballot to the gender of the mayor in her municipality. We find no significant differences and thus conclude that a higher share of female candidates on the ballot cannot explain the baseline findings.
Change in type of female candidates
Another mechanism that could explain the baseline estimates is that different types of women come forward as candidates in municipalities with female mayors. This may be because of a role model or encouragement effect of female mayors. Another possibility is that women and party leaders anticipate a reduction in voter bias in municipalities that have elected a female mayor, motivating more qualified women to run or, alternatively, leading party leaders to put more qualified women on the ballot. The baseline effect estimated above would then be an aggregate of the reduction in voter bias, the higher qualification of female candidates, and the increased likelihood that voters will elect qualified female candidates.
We have collected information on candidate characteristics for around 50% of the candidates in our sample. Using this data, we estimate RDD regressions using candidate characteristics (age, educational attainment, type of employment, and the employment status of female candidates) as dependent variables. The results are collected in Table 6 . We find hardly any significant differences. Female candidates are slightly more likely (by about 6.5%) to be lawyers and slightly less likely (by about 5%) to be self-employed if their municipality is led by a woman. 31
Reduction in voter bias due to change in turnout
Yet another channel that could explain the baseline result is that more pro-female voters turn out in council elections, thus improving the electoral performance of women. Alternatively, there may be a demobilization of anti-female voters. Thus, the improvement in list ranks by women would not only be due to a reduction in voter bias of existing voters, but due to a change in the voter pool. While the bias of the average voter would still decline, the channel through which this effect comes about would be different. 31 We have also explored differences in characteristics of male candidates in municipalities with male and female mayors and in this case found no substantial differences, either.
To explore this issue, we estimate the effect of female mayors on turnout using municipalitylevel turnout data from the Statistical Office of Hesse. Using the specification in Equation 1, we replace the dependent variable with the turnout in municipality i in election t. The results in Table   7 indicate that there are no effects of female mayors on turnout. It is neither higher nor lower in municipalities with female and male mayors. 32 7 Extensions
Incumbent vs. non-incumbent female candidates
In this section, we explore whether the treatment effect varies with the incumbency status of female council candidates (i. e. whether or not she was a member of the previous council). If it is mainly exposure to female mayors which reduces anti-female bias, we should expect that new and relatively unknown female candidates, i. e. non-incumbents, benefit the most. That is, voters who statistically discriminate against women should be less biased toward female candidates whom they have already witnessed as effective politicians and therefore be just as likely to vote for them as for a male candidate even when their municipality is male-led. Anti-female bias is most likely directed toward unknown female candidates.
We explore this question by estimating our RDD model with subsamples for incumbent and non-incumbent female candidates. 33 The results are collected in Table A .9 in the online appendix.
Specifically, we compare in Panel A the rank changes of incumbent female candidates in male-and 32 Of course, this is only suggestive evidence based on the data that is available. We cannot exclude that we find the level of turnout to remain fairly constant because the mobilization of pro-female and the demobilization of anti-female voters exactly balances. 33 We infer incumbency status from a fuzzy match of candidate names. We acknowledge that we may not identify all incumbents, for example if female council members get married and change their surnames. However, note that the average age of female candidates in our sample is 51 years and hence this concern is hardly relevant.
female-led municipalities and in Panel B the rank changes of non-incumbent female candidates.
We observe a significant difference according to incumbency status. Female candidates who were already members of the previous council receive no benefit from having a female mayor with respect to their relative gain relative to incumbent female candidates in male-led constituencies. In contrast, non-incumbent women in municipalities with female mayors experience a strong increase compared to non-incumbent women in male-led municipalities, indicating that the effect observed in the baseline regressions is due to this group of female candidates. In the non-incumbent subsample, the coefficient is 4.3, while it is substantially smaller (0.5 to 1.4) and insignificant in the incumbent subsample. Hence, in a median-sized local council a non-incumbent female candidate moves up 1.3 ranks when there is a female mayor compared to when there is a male mayor.
Share of female council members
In this section, we study whether the rank gains observed in the baseline regressions actually leads to an increase in the share of elected women. We thus estimate a model that relates a dummy for the gender of an elected council member to the gender of the mayor. In other words, we explore whether the likelihood that a council member is female, or equivalently the share of female council members, is higher in municipalities with female mayors.
The results are collected in Table A .10 in the online appendix. Given that the results in Section 7.1 indicate that the effects of a female mayor differ between incumbent and non-incumbent council candidates, we report results for the entire sample of female candidates as well as for two subsamples. According to Panel A, we find a positive but insignificant effect of female mayors on the likelihood that a candidate elected to the council is female (or, alternatively, on the share of women among all elected candidates).
In Panel B, we explore the effect of female mayors among incumbent council members who were elected to the next council. In these regressions, we find a negative but again insignificant effect. In Panel C, we finally study the effect of female mayors on non-incumbent candidates elected to the next council. The share of women among non-incumbent candidates that were elected to the council is about 10% higher in municipalities with female mayors. These results reaffirm that particularly non-incumbent and thus unknown female candidates benefit from female mayors. Female mayors ostensibly make it easier for new women candidates to obtain their first political office. 34
Spillovers to neighboring municipalities
Exposure to a female mayor may not only reduce voter bias in her own municipality but also in neighboring municipalities (Broockman, 2014) . There are presumably many interactions between inhabitants of neighboring municipalities and news of such events as the election of a female mayors likely travel across administrative borders. Moreover, local media markets tend to be integrated. We thus estimate models where we replace the dependent variable in Equation 1 with the rank change of female candidates in all municipalities that are contiguous to municipality i.
We thus compare the rank change of female candidates in municipalities that are contiguous to municipalities with a closely elected female or male mayor. 35 The results are collected in Table A .11 in the online appendix. We find that the effect of female mayors reaches beyond municipality borders. Female council candidates in municipalities that are contiguous to a municipality with a female mayor perform better than female candidates in municipalities that that are contiguous to a male-led municipality. The magnitude of the effect is about 1.5 ranks, which translates to a 0.5 rank advancement in a municipality with a median council size. Hence, the effect is smaller than in the baseline regressions, indicating a degree of spatial decay. 36
Effect over time
Another interesting question is whether the effect of a female mayor persists over time. If exposure to a female mayor truly diminishes voter bias, then female candidates should perform well not only in the concurrent election but also in future elections where the identity of the mayor may have already changed. We thus explore how a female mayor affects the performance of female candidates in the election after the next (e. g. how female candidates in municipalities that had a female mayor at the council election in 2001 performed in the council election held in 2006).
The results are collected in Table A .12 in the online appendix. We find a significant and positive effect on rank changes of women. The magnitude of the effect is as large as 5.1, i. e. larger than in the baseline regressions (for a median council size of 31 this translates into a rank advancement of 1.6 compared to 1.2 according to the baseline results). This suggests that the reduction in anti-female bias accumulates over time. 37 36 A fortiori, these results also serve to rule out another possible explanation for the baseline findings. Voters may be more likely to vote for women in municipalities with female mayors if they believe that female councilors work better with female mayors (and vice versa). However, municipalities that are contiguous to municipalities with female mayors will in most cases be led by a male mayor (given the larger share of male mayors in Hesse). Our evidence for spillovers to neighboring municipalities in rank advancements hence indicates that our baseline results do not come about because voters expect female councilors to work better with female mayors. Anyways given that the mayor has not much direct influence over policy decisions (see Section 2.2.1), how well the mayor and the council collaborate may not be a major concern for voters in our setting.
Conclusion
We study the effect of female mayors on electoral outcomes of female candidates for open-list council elections. Female candidates advance more relative to their initial ranking if the mayor of their municipality is female. Exploring alternative explanations for this finding, the most likely explanation is that exposure to successful female politicians reduces voter bias (specifically statistical discrimination) against female politicians. The effect is concentrated on non-incumbent (relatively unknown) female candidates, translates into a higher share of women among non-incumbent candidates elected to the council, persists and grows to the next election, and spreads to neighboring municipalities. Overall, our results indicate that exposing voters to successful female politicians can be an important means to increase female representation in politics. Women who manage to obtain a key political office seem to have wider spillovers regarding the ability of women to obtain offices in other branches of government.
That such demonstration effects can be effective in diminishing voter biases against women has been shown previously with regard to quotas. Yet, quotas remain controversial and it is unclear whether they can fundamentally transform voters' perceptions about female politics. There may be, for example, a stigma attached to female politicians who obtain reserved offices. At first sight, such concerns appear to be less relevant if a woman obtains an important political office by winning a competitive election. Yet, previous research has also shown that for competitive elections demonstration effects remain limited because (male) party leaders may cause a backlash against female candidates (Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras, and Iyer, 2016) . Against this backdrop, it is important to note that according to our findings, a backlash against women candidates must not necessarily materialize and that, therefore, demonstration effects of women winning competitive elections can be powerful.
One tangible policy implication of these results is that to advance gender parity in politics, parties should do more to identify suitable female candidates and encourage them to run for partic-ularly exposed offices (mayors, prime ministers, presidents, etc) . 38 While such efforts will increase female representation by itself in these key offices, an arguably more important effect is that these female leaders may clear the way for female politicians in general by persistently reducing voter biases and negative stereotypes against women in politics. Notes: This table reports results from local linear (Model I-IV) and quadratic (Model V) regressions that relate the gender of the mayor to the normalized change (absolute change in spots divided by council size) of female candidates in local elections. We report results for various bandwidths: optimal CCT (Model I, V), one half of optimal the optimal CCT (Model II), twice the optimal CCT (Model II), and optimal IK (Model IV). Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Heteroscedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The unit of clustering is the municipality of the candidate. Notes: This table reports results from local linear (Model I-IV) and quadratic (Model V) regressions that relate the gender of the mayor to a dummy variable for whether a candidate on the ballot is female. We report results for various bandwidths: optimal CCT (Model I, V), one half of optimal the optimal CCT (Model II), twice the optimal CCT (Model II), and optimal IK (Model IV). Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Heteroscedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The unit of clustering is the municipality of the candidate. Notes: This table reports results from local linear (Model I-IV) and quadratic (Model V) regressions that relate the gender of the mayor to voter turnout in local elections in a given municipality. We report results for various bandwidths: optimal CCT (Model I, V), one half of optimal the optimal CCT (Model II), twice the optimal CCT (Model II), and optimal IK (Model IV). Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Heteroscedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The unit of clustering is the municipality of the candidate. Figure 3 : Initial list ranks of female candidates. This graph shows a RDD plot for the (normalized) initial list rank of female candidates in the council elections when the current mayor is female or male. The running variable is the margin of victory of a female candidate for the mayorship in mixed-gender races (where the top two candidates are female and male). Observations to the right of the threshold are under a female mayor. Each dot is the local average of the gains of women in bins of three percent for the margin of victory. The solid lines are from a local linear smooth of the underlying observations. The gray-shaded area are the 95% confidence intervals. Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). The "other" category comprises mostly mayors that have run as independents or were supported by municipality-specific voter initiatives. We report results for various bandwidths: optimal CCT (Model I, V), one half of optimal the optimal CCT (Model II), twice the optimal CCT (Model II), and optimal IK (Model IV). Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Heteroscedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The unit of clustering is the municipality of the candidate. ) and to a dummy for whether a female council candidate had a positive rank change. We report results for various bandwidths: optimal CCT (Model I, V), one half of optimal the optimal CCT (Model II), twice the optimal CCT (Model II), and optimal IK (Model IV). Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Heteroscedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The unit of clustering is the municipality of the candidate. Notes: This table reports results from parametric RDD regressions that relate the gender of the mayor to the normalized rank change (absolute rank change divided by council size) of female candidates in local elections. We report results for the full sample using various flexible polynomials. Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Heteroscedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The unit of clustering is the municipality of the candidate. Notes: This table reports results from local linear (Model I-IV) and quadratic (Model V) regressions that relate the gender of the mayor to the rank change of female candidates for the local council for two subsamples: (i) female council candidates who were already a member of the previous council and (ii) female council candidates who were not members of the previous council. We report results for various bandwidths: optimal CCT (Model I, V), one half of optimal the optimal CCT (Model II), twice the optimal CCT (Model II), and optimal IK (Model IV). Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Heteroscedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The unit of clustering is the party of the candidate. Notes: This table reports results from local linear (Model I-IV) and quadratic (Model V) regressions that relate the gender of the mayor to a dummy variable for whether a candidate elected to the council is female. We report results for various bandwidths: optimal CCT (Model I, V), one half of optimal the optimal CCT (Model II), twice the optimal CCT (Model II), and optimal IK (Model IV). We report results for three samples: the full sample of female candidates, a subsample with female candidates who were already members of the past council (incumbents) and a subsample with other female candidates (non-incumbents). Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Heteroscedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The unit of clustering is the municipality of the candidate. Notes: This table reports results from local linear (Model I-IV) and quadratic (Model V) regressions that relate the gender of the mayor to the normalized rank change (absolute rank change divided by council size) of female candidates in local elections in neighboring municipalities. We report results for various bandwidths: optimal CCT (Model I, V), one half of optimal the optimal CCT (Model II), twice the optimal CCT (Model II), and optimal IK (Model IV). Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Heteroscedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The unit of clustering is the municipality of the candidate. Notes: This table reports results from local linear (Model I-IV) and quadratic (Model V) regressions that relate the gender of the mayor to the normalized rank change (absolute rank change divided by council size) of female candidates in the local elections after the next. We report results for various bandwidths: optimal CCT (Model I, V), one half of optimal the optimal CCT (Model II), twice the optimal CCT (Model II), and optimal IK (Model IV). Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***). Heteroscedasticity and cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The unit of clustering is the municipality of the candidate. 
